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THE NATURE OF BANKRUPTCY
AND INSOLVENCY IN
A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
By JoHN HONSBERGER, Q.C.*
I
Historically, the distinction between bankruptcy and insolvency was
significant. The distinction no longer has its former importance but by reason
of the constitutional grant of power in Canada and in other countries with a
federal constitution there is a continuing constitutional importance in being
able to define with some precision the meaning of the words "bankruptcy"
and "insolvency".
What is generally considered to be the first Bankruptcy Act in England
was enacted in 1542 during the reign of Henry VIII.1 It was directed at the
fraudulent debtor. However, the Bankruptcy Acts from 15712 until the middle
of the last century were restricted to those debtors who were engaged in trade.
It was not until 1861 that the bankruptcy law in England was made applicable
to all debtors whether or not they were traders.3 In the early 19th century
when the Bankruptcy Acts were confined to traders, a number of statutes
known as Insolvency Acts were enacted for the relief of insolvent debtors who
were not engaged in trade and therefore could not be made bankrupt. At first,
the Insolvency Acts provided only for the release from imprisonment of the
debtor who had been imprisoned for his debts. He was not, however, released
of his debts and remained liable for their repayment. Later legislation provided
for the discharge of persons who were imprisoned for their debts if they sur-
rendered all of their property for the benefit of their creditors. The insolvency
laws were administered by a separate court of record known as the Court for
Relief of Insolvent Debtors. This court eventually was abolished by the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 18614 and its jurisdiction transferred to the Court of Bankruptcy
when persons other than traders first became subject to the bankruptcy law.
In 1869, by the Bankruptcy Repeal and Insolvent Court Act5 all insolvency
statutes existing in England at that time were repealed.
An historical coincidence of some importance is that while the distinction
between bankruptcy and insolvency legislation was disappearing in England,
in Canada the resolutions leading to the enactment of the British North America
* Member of the Ontario Bar, Toronto.
1 34 and 35, Henry VII, C. 4.
2 13 Eliz. 1, C. 7.
3 24 and 25 Vic. C. 135.
4 See note 3, supra.
5 32 and 33 Vic., C. 83.
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Act, 18676 were being drafted. It can be assumed that the draftsmen in addition
to being aware of the legislative history of bankruptcy and insolvency in Eng-
land were also well aware of the American experience.
The United States constitution was drafted in 1787. Under it Congress
was granted the legislative authority to pass "uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States". From the time of its ratification
until the drafting of the British North America Act, 1867 there had been more
or less a continuous debate in and out of the courts of the United States as to
whether the bankruptcy grant of power either permitted Congress or prevented
the States from enacting insolvency legislation. For example, in Sturges v.
Crowninshied7 an elaborate argument was founded on the distinction between
bankruptcy and insolvency. However, Chief Justice Marshall did not commit
himself to the distinctions which had been made, namely, that laws which
liberate the person are insolvent laws and those which discharge the contract
are bankrupt laws and that insolvent laws operate at the instance of the debtor,
while bankrupt laws, operate at the instance of the creditor.
It would seem that a deliberate effort was made in Canada to forestall a
similar debate over the bankruptcy power that had taken place in the United
States. Section 91 of the British North America Act, 1867 gave to the Parlia-
ment of Canada the authority "to make laws for the Peace, Order and good
Government of Canada in relation to all matters not coming within the
Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the
Provinces". "For greater certainty", it enumerated certain classes of subjects
over which the Parliament of Canada was to have the exclusive legislative
authority. One of these classes of subjects is "Bankruptcy and Insolvency".
II
"Insolvency" is derived from the latin in, "not" and solvere, "to loosen
or pay". The word, however, has two principal uses representing two different
concepts each of which is incorporated into the present Bankruptcy Act.8
The first and ordinary meaning of insolvency and the concept most
readily identified is the state or condition of being unable to pay one's debts
as they mature.9 This concept is variously known as ordinary,10 common law,
6 30 and 31 Vic. C. 62.
7 (1819), 4 Wheat. 122 and see also Ogden v. Saunders (1827), 12 Wheat. 213.
8 R.S.C. 1970 c. B-3.
9 Murray, New English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883). See In re
Assignments and Preferences Act (1893), 20 O.A.R. 489 (C.A.) reversed by [1894]
A.C. 187 (P.C.). See also A.-G. for B.C. v. A.-G. Can. et al. [1937] A.C. 391, [1937] 1
D.L.R. 695, 18 C.B.R. 212, [1937] 1 W.W.R. 320 per Lord Thankerton and Ladore v.
Bennett [1939] A.C. 468, 21 C.B.R. 1 (P.C.) in which it was said "Insolvency is the inability
to pay debts in the ordinary course as they become due."
10 1. A. MacLauchlan, Bankruptcy (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1956) at 10.
I1 Garrard Glen, Creditors Rights and Remedies, 1915 s. 370.
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equity12 or commercial 13 insolvency. One writer has suggested that it perhaps
could be best described as inability insolvency. 14 Traditionally, the stoppage
of payments or the inability to pay debts as they mature was a concept
peculiar to commercial law and not to be confused with insolvency which
was originally regarded as the second of the two concepts we now have of
insolvency.
The inability concept of insolvency depends upon the debtor's inability
to pay debts precisely as they mature. It does not allow any period of grace
to the debtor who while unable to pay on the due date could pay in a reason-
able time. While this aspect may be regarded as being unduly harsh in respect
of the debtor, it is balanced in his favour to some extent by the fact that it
does not and may not take into account the prospective inability of the debtor
to pay debts that have not matured.
Inability insolvency under the Canadian Bankruptcy Act is described in
the definition of an insolvent person which reads in part as
" a person...
(i) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally
become due, or
(ii) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of
business as they generally become due." 15
Similar language also is found in the act of bankruptcy of a debtor who ceases
"to meet his liabilities generally as they become due."' 6
The second concept of insolvency which is also contained in the Bank-
ruptcy Act as an alternative definition to the inability concept is where the
aggregate of a person's property is not at a fair valuation sufficient, or, if
disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, "would not be
sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations due and accruing due".17
This is known as balance sheet insolvency or insolvency in the bankruptcy
sense. It might be called balance insolvency to distinguish it from inability
insolvency.' 8 This concept of insolvency describes an internal condition, the
12 J. A. MacLauchlan, supra, note 9 at 12. "Ordinary insolvency is frequently called
insolvency 'in the equity sense' to differentiate it from insolvency in the bankruptcy sense".
13 
"There are decisions as to the meaning of the word 'insolvent'. They all state that
'insolvency' means commercial insolvency, that is to say inability to pay debts as they
become due." London and Counties Assets Ltd. v. Brighton Grand Concert Hall & Picture
Palace Ltd., [1915] 2 K.B. 493 (C.A.) per Buckley L.J. at 501, 503.
14 S. Joslin, Insolvency in Bankruptcy: a synthesis (1962), 38 Indiana Law Journal 23.
15 R.S.C. 970 c. B-3, s. 2.
16 Section 24G) and see Winding Up Act R.S.C. 1972 C.W.-10, s. 3(a).
17 Bankruptcy Act R.S.C. 1970, c. B-3, s. 1, compare with the definition of insolvency
contained in the United States Bankruptcy Act, s. 1(19). "A person shall be deemed insol-
vent within the provisions of the Act whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of
any property which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted
to be concealed or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall
not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts."
18 S. Joslin, supra, note 14.
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existence of which can be legally ascertained only through a comprehensive
examination of the debtor's entire financial condition.19
A debtor may be solvent by the balance sheet test but the general
stoppage of payments on his part usually creates a situation requiring either
the liquidation of his property or the making of some arrangement with his
creditors. In the business world people lose their credit if they cannot pay
their debts. The businessman has little inclination to argue about the value
of assets shown on a balance sheet. Moreover, a debtor seldom makes
available to the person he hopes will extend him credit the kind of evidence
he will usually adduce to prove that he was not insolvent in a subsequent
bankruptcy proceedings. 20
Sometimes insolvency is the result of some sudden disaster such as fire,
flood or theft by an employee. More often it is the result of a gradual deteri-
oration in a debtor's ability to pay his debts. The usual order of events is
that a debtor stops payments or is unable to pay his debts as they mature.
Through the resulting loss of credit from his cessation of payments he must
live off his assets which in turn makes him insolvent in the sense of balance
insolvency. Thus, actual or apparent insolvency on the part of a debtor which
is generally in the form of stoppage of payments is the beginning of the road
that usually leads to bankruptcy.
Perhaps the essence of insolvency legislation as compared with bank-
ruptcy is that insolvency contemplates measures of dealing with the property
of debtors unable to pay their debts other than by liquidation through bank-
ruptcy. The composition and voluntary assignment, for example, are devices
which, in appropriate circumstances, avoid technical bankruptcy. These means
of salvage from the ravages of misfortune, while of the essence of insolvency,
are now incorporated in the Bankruptcy Act.21
Insolvency in its widest sense is now used under the Canadian and
American bankruptcy systems as the principal test to determine who shall
or shall not be subjected to the peculiar effects of the bankruptcy process.
Thus, it has been frequently observed that our modem law of bankruptcy is
essentially a law of insolvency. 2
Bankruptcy has a more restricted or narrower meaning than insolvency.
The word bankrupt is derived from the Italian "banca rotta" which is literally
"bank broken" or "bench broken". The allusion is said to be to the custom of
19 See Bonbright and Pickett, Valuation to Determine Solvency under the Bankruptcy
Act (1929), 29 Col. L. Rev. 582.
2o MacLauchlan, supra, note 10 at 56.
21 Canadian Bankers Association et al. v. A.-G. of Saskatchewan, [1950] S.C.R. 31;
[1954] 4 D.L.R. 599; (1955), 35 C.B.R. 135.
22 Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank v. Chicago R. 1 & P. Ry. (1935), 294 U.S. 648 at
668 per Sutherland J.
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breaking the table or counter of a defaulting tradesman. This became the
symbol of a trader's failure.23
Over the years bankruptcy has undergone a series of transfers of sense
as the legislation has been repeatedly amended. The need for frequent changes
in the legislation has resulted from changing social and commercial conditions
that upset the legislative balance between the conflicting interests arising out
of a financial failure. Percerou's explanation of the long history of legislative
tinkering with bankruptcy legislation is,
D'abord, 6tant donn6 le nombre et la complexit6 des inter~ts auxquels touche
l'institution il est presque impossible qu'elle ne soit pas imparfaite sur certains points
et plus impossible encore qu'au bout de peu de temps, quelqu'un des int6r~ts engages
dans le problime ayant 6volu6, une modification correspondante de la loi ne devienne
n6cessaire. A cette consid6ration s'en ajoute un autre d'ordre moral: tout le monde
perd dans la faillite et par un sentiment bien humain, encore que peu justifi6, on
sen prend au l6gislateur des pertes que l'on subit, alors qu'elles tiennent en rdalit6
b la situation de fait... Ainsi s'explique la fr6quence des changements h la ldgislation
des faillites si nombreux dans tous les pays.24
The courts also have frequently referred to the changing concept of
bankruptcy. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in an appeal from
the Supreme Court of Canada, said:
In a normal community it is certain that these conditions (which bring the bank-
ruptcy law into operation) will require revision from time to time. Their lordships
are unable to hold that the conditions of insolvency which enabled a creditor or the
debtor to invoke the aid of the bankruptcy laws, or the classes to which these laws
applied, were intended to be stereotyped under head 21 of section 91 of the British
North America Act so as to confine the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada
to the legislative provisions then existing as regards to these matters.25
Much the same observation was made by the Supreme Court of the
United States a year later when it said:
The subject of bankruptcies is incapable of final definition. The concept changes.
It has been recognized that it is not limited to the connotation of the phrase in
England or in the United States at the time of the formulation of the Constitution.26
While the underlying principles and character of bankruptcy have
changed over the years, there has been a remarkable consistency in how the
courts and legal writers have described the objects and purposes of bankruptcy
legislation. Some of these definitions (the country of the person who pro-
pounded the definition and the year in which it was written are in brackets
at the end of each definition) are:
Les biens due d6biteur sont le gage commun de ses cr6anciers. 27 (France 1804).
Perhaps, as satisfactory a description of a bankruptcy law as can be framed is that
it is a law for the benefit and relief of creditors and their debtors in cases in which
the latter are unable or unwilling to pay their debts. And a law on the subject of
23 Murray, The New English Dictionary (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1883); Nouveau
Petit Larousse 1968 under 'banqueroute"; J. Percerou, Des faillites et banqueroutes et des
liquidations judicaires, (2nd ed.) 1935, Vol. 1, at 14, n. 1.24 Percerou, Id. Vol. 1, at 37.
25A.-G. for British Columbia v. A.-G. of Canada (Re Farmers Creditors Arrange-
ment Act, 1934) [1937] A.C. 391, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 695, [1937] 1 W.W.R. 320, 18 C.B.R.
217.
26 Wright v. Union Central Insurance Co. (1938), 304 U.S. 502 at 513.
27 Code Civil (le Code Napoleon) Art. 2093 (104).
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bankruptcies in the sense of the constitution is a law making provisions for cases
of persons who fail to pay their debts.28 (United States, 1833).
Congress has general jurisdiction; and the true inquiry is to what limits is thatjurisdiction restricted? I hold it extends to all cases where the law causes to be
distributed the property of the debtor among his creditors; this is its least limits.
Its greatest is a discharge of the debtor from his contract and all intermediate
legislation, affecting substance and form but tending to further the great end of the
subject . . . distribution and discharge are in the competency and discretion of
Congress.29 (United States, 1843).
"Bankruptcy" is the condition of a trader who has discontinued his payments.3 0
(Canada, 1866).
Bankruptcy is the National execution against the assets of an insolvent debtor.31
(United States, 1872).
The object of the bankruptcy laws was merely to regulate the distribution of the
bankrupt's assets between his creditors and to relieve the bankrupt and his estate
from future liability to his creditors.32 (England, 1881).
It is not necessary in their Lordships' opinion, nor would it be expedient to attempt
to define what is covered by the words "bankruptcy" and "insolvency" in section 91
of the B.N.A. Act. But it would seem that it is a feature common to all the systems
of bankruptcy and insolvency to which reference has been made, that the enact-
ments are designed to secure that in the case of an insolvent person his assets shall
be rateably distributed amongst his creditors whether he is willing that they shall
be so distributed or not. Although provision may be made for a voluntary assignment
as an alternative, it is only as an alternative. In reply to a question put by their
Lordships, the learned counsel for the respondent were unable to point to any
scheme of bankruptcy or insolvency which did not involve some power of compul-
sion by process of law to secure to the creditors distribution amongst them of the
insolvent's estate.33 (England, 1894).
Equality between creditors is necessarily the ultimate aim of the bankrupt law.34
(United States, 1913).
... a main purpose of the act intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a
fresh start in life, free from debts, except of a certain character, after the bankruptcy
has been administered for the benefit of the creditors.35 (United States, 1917).
The broad purpose of a bankruptcy act is the bringing about of an equitable distri-
bution of a bankrupt's estate among creditors holding just demands based upon
adequate consideration.36 (United States, 1930).
An ajudication in bankruptcy is not essential to the jurisdiction. The subject of
bankruptcy is nothing less than "the subject of the relations between an insolvent
or non-paying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors extending to his and their
relief".3 7 (United States, 1938).
The purpose and object of the Bankruptcy Act is to equitably distribute the assets
of the debtor and to permit his rehabilitation as a citizen, unfettered by past debts.38
(Canada, 1952).
28 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, s. 113, n. 2.
29 In re Klein (1843), 1 How. 277 (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
30 Civil Code of Quebec, Art 17 (23).
31 Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, 1872.
32Ex. p. Walton, In re Levy (1881), 17 Ch. D. 746 at 755 (C.A.).
33 A.-G. (Ont.) v. A.-G. (Can.) (Voluntary Assignments Case) [1894] A.C. 189; 63
L.J. P.C. 59.
34 Clark v. Rogers (1913), 228 U.S. 534, 548.
35 Stellwagen v. Clum (1917), 245 U.S. 605 at 617 per Day J.36 Kolhe v. R. C. Taylor Trust (Mass.) (1930), 50 S. Ct. 142 at 143,28 U.S. 224.
37 Wright v. Union Central Insurance Co. (1938), 304 U.S. 502 at 513.
38LA.C. and T. Eaton Co. v. Lalonde et al. (1952) 2 S.C.R. 109; [1952] 3 D.L.R.
348; 3 C.B.R. 192.
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The purpose of a bankruptcy act has been defined as providing for the orderly
distribution of the property of a bankrupt among his creditors on a pan pasu basis
subject to the privileged claims and to permit a bankrupt to receive eventually a
complete discharge of his debts in order that he may be able to integrate himself
into the business life of the country as a useful citizen free from the crushing burden
of debt.39 (Canada, 1954).
Bankruptcy is a well understood procedure by which an insolvent debtor's property
is coercively brought under a judicial administration in the interests primarily of
the creditors. To this proceeding not only a personal stigma may attach but restric-
tions on freedom in future business activity may result. The relief to the debtor con-
sists in the cancellation of debts which, otherwise, might effectually prevent him
from rehabilitating himself economically and socially.40 (Canada, 1955).
According to one distinguished author:
All bankruptcy law. . . no matter when or where devised and enacted has at least
two general objects in view. It aims first to secure an equitable division of the
insolvent debtor's property among all his creditors and, in the second place, to pre-
vent on the part of the insolvent debtor conduct detrimental to the interests of his
creditors. In other words, bankruptcy law seeks to protect the creditors, first from
one another and, secondly, from debtor. A third object, the protection of the honest
debtor from his creditors, by means of the discharge is sought to be attained in some
of the systems of bankruptcy but this is by no means a fundamental feature of the
law.41
These definitions of the objects and purposes of bankruptcy if they do
not with precision indicate the nature or essence of bankruptcy, at least
indicate its complexity. Bankruptcy is a highly procedural branch of the
law and very closely related to the law of contracts and execution, administra-
tive law, criminal law and equity. It has dimensions that are both private and
public, national and international. It has its collective aspects as well as a
concern for the individual. It can be both preventative and remedial. It can
punish and it can rehabilitate. It is designed to protect creditors, their debtors
and business confidence in the credit system. While bankruptcy must be severe
enough to discourage fraud, it must not be so severe that it will discourage
the debtor and destroy his initiative. What then is essential to bankruptcy
and what is only incidental?
Max Radin in a penetrating analysis on the nature of bankruptcy42
suggests that the way to approach what "bankruptcy" means is to look at
bankruptcy as a legal process meant to perform an important commercial
function.
What function? Mr. Justice Rand in the Canadian Bankers Association
Case43 said that the function was to coercively bring an insolvent debtor's
property under a judicial administration in the interests primarily of the
39 Markis v. Soccio & Corso Restaurants Inc., [1954] Que. S.C. 457; (1954), 35 C.B.R.
1 at 5 (Que.) per Collins J.
40 Canadian Bankers Association et al. v. A.-G. of Saskatchewan [1956] S.C.R. 31;
[1954]4 D.L.R. 599; (1955), 35 C.B.R. 135 per Rand J.
41Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law (1918), 66 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
223 at 225.
42 Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy (1940), 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1.
43 Id.
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creditors. Similarly, in the Voluntary Assignments Case44 it was said that
the common feature of all systems of bankruptcy and insolvency was some
power of compulsion by process of law to secure to the creditors distribution
amongst them of the insolvent's estate. Bankruptcy, however, must mean
more than this as this function of compulsion upon the debtor is already
performed through the ordinary writs of execution and the other writs and
procedures in aid of execution.
It also has been said that the function of the Bankruptcy Act is to permit
the rehabilitation of a debtor as a citizen, unfettered by past debts. 45 It is
obvious that bankruptcy must amount to something more than this for the
same result could be achieved by the general cancellation of debts somewhat
in the nature of the Biblical Jubilee.46 Similar relief on a temporary basis
also could be achieved by a limited or general moratorium.
Garrard Glenn in an article on the essentials of bankruptcy found that
a careful study of bankruptcy indicated two well worn propositions. First,
he said, "there is always the fraudulent debtor; and never yet, so far as
human experience goes, has it been proper to legislate in bankruptcy matters
without providing for his case. Next, the idea of bankruptcy includes the
concept of a debtor who is in the control of the court". Glenn's concept of
a controllable debtor was that the bankrupt must do two things. He must give
full discovery of his estate and his doings and in order to do this he must
surrender to the court not only his estate but himself. Such, said Glenn, is
the method by which fraud can be detected and creditors will get their due
While these propositions are almost always found in any bankruptcy legisla-
tion and in fact are very important elements they are not essential elements.
The normal execution process with the right to examine a judgment debtor
contains most of the elements of the "controllable debtor" and the criminal
law effectively can deal with the fraudulent debtor.
Max Radin in his analysis of the nature of bankruptcy examines these
functions and others in his search for the essence of bankruptcy. He rejects
the concept of compulsion upon the debtor as enunciated in such cases as
the Voluntary Assignments Case47 and the Canadian Bankers Association48
case and suggests that the true test is the concept of compulsion upon the
creditors. He said:
Whatever purposes bankruptcy attempts to carry out, it does by working on the
creditors primarily by compelling them to re-organize their relations to the
debtor's property. No extension of the bankruptcy power has, in fact, attempted
anything else, whatever the words used may have been.. .49
44A.G. (Ont.) v. A.G. (Can.) (Voluntary Assignments Case), [1894] A.C. 189, 63
LI. P.C. 59.
45 See for example I.A.C. and T. Eaton Co. v. Lalonde et al., [1952] S.C.R. 109;
[1952] 3 D.L.R. 348; 32 C.B.R. 192 (Can.).
46 Deuteronomy C. 15.
47 A.-G. (Ont.) v. A.-G. (Can.) (Voluntary Assignments Case), [1894] A.C. 189, 63
LJ. P.C. 59.
48 Canadian Bankers Association et al. v. A.-G. of Saskatchewan, [1956] S.C.R. 31;
[1954] 4 D.L.R. 599; (1955), 35 C.B.R. 135.
49 Radin, see, supra, note 42.
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Everything else is clearly incidental. The bankrupt might be stripped of all his prop-
erty and thrown into prison. He might be allowed certain exemptions. He might be
relieved of his debts or have them scaled down or postponed. All these stages of
increasing humanity toward an unsuccessful member of the commercial community.
He might even be helped to reconstruct and carry on his business and this, with a
view to maintaining an economic unit that involved a great many persons who are
not properly creditors.
But whatever happens to the debtor; in every case the creditors have been assembled
in some formal way, their clains examined and classified, and assigned for satisfac-
tion in definite proportions to an existing or prospective fund. The extent of the
participation of the creditors in the final disposition is also irrelevant. Whoever
initiates the process and however it is done, the important thing is that the bank-
ruptcy court or commission rounds up the creditors and compells them to adjust
or discharge their claims in a particular way.5 0
Thus, whatever else a bankruptcy statute purports to do, there is always
some method provided to compel all of the creditors to accept some arrange-
ment or disposition of their claims against the debtor whether all of them
agree or not. Adopting this test of the essential nature of bankruptcy, a
statute regulating voluntary arrangements by a debtor with creditors willing
to participate in the arrangement could not be regarded as bankruptcy legis-
lation. The Creditors Relief Act5' provides for the money that a sheriff levies
under an execution against the property of a debtor to be rateably distributed
among all execution creditors. It may be regarded as insolvency legislation
and thus ultra vires the province but it cannot be regarded as bankruptcy
legislation. While the creditors must share on a pro rata basis in the money
levied they are not required to release or otherwise adjust their claims against
the debtor. On the other hand, straight bankruptcy, whether voluntary or
involuntary, proposals, and wage earner's plans under Part X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act are all clearly matters of bankruptcy for in each case all of the
creditors whether they all agree or not are compelled to accept some arrange-
ment or disposition of their claims.
Chief Justice Waite of the Supreme Court of the United States once
said that bankruptcy is an example in which the general welfare of the com-
munity is achieved by mutual sacrifices of various groups in it.52 While the
debtor usually and the creditors almost always are required to make sacrifices
in a bankruptcy, the essence of bankruptcy is not in any voluntary sacrifices
that the creditors may be called upon to make but in the compulsory or
involuntary sacrifices required on the part of the creditors whether or not
there is any sacrifice on the part of the debtor.53 Everything else that is in-
cluded in the constitutional grant of power in respect of bankruptcy is inci-
dental or ancilliary to this essential function.
50 See, supra, note 42 at 4.
51 R.S.C. 1970 c. 97.
52 Canada Southern R.R. v. Gebbard (1883), 109 U.S. 527 at 536.
53 The debtor may not have any property that will vest in his trustee on his bank-
ruptcy. The only sacrifice he is called upon to make, in these circumstances, is his reputa-
tion for financial integrity which, in most cases, he has already lost before he is adjudged
a bankrupt.
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